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The Federal Reserve System was
formed in 1914. Wide dissatisfaction with
routinely expensive and slow settlement of
interregional payments, as well as occa-
sional disruptions of the payments system
caused by banking panics, are among the
factors that led to its creation. Accordingly,
an important purpose for creating the Fed-
eral Reserve to serve as the nation’s central
bank was to enhance the efﬁciency and
improve the stability of the nation’s pay-
ments system.
At the time of the formation of the
Federal Reserve, the paper check was the
principle means of making payment. The
Federal Reserve attempted to fulﬁll its
mandate for improving the check-collec-
tion system by providing banks with a
national check-collection service.
1 Since 
it was the only institution with a nation-
wide network of banking ofﬁces and
settlement accounts for banks, it had an
advantage in interregional check collec-
tion. Over time, the Reserve Banks added
new payment services to exploit the ad-
vantages of new technology:  wire transfer
of reserves, a book-entry service for safe-
keeping and electronically transferring
ownership of government securities, and
the automated clearinghouse, designed as
an electronic alternative to checks.
The share of U.S. dollar payments pro-
cessed through the Federal Reserve Banks
began declining in 1980, when the Reserve
Banks began charging for payment ser-
vices, as required by the Monetary Control
Act. This declining share, for both small-
and large-dollar payments, appears to rep-
resent a major shift in the operation of the
U.S. dollar payments system. Our paper
examines the implications of this shift for
the Federal Reserve’s ability to fulﬁll its
mandate to safeguard the stability and 
efﬁciency of the payments system. In 
particular, we examine whether the prob-
lems that existed in the payments system
prior to 1914 will at some time reappear as
the Fed’s operational role declines. It is
important to consider whether the nation’s
payments system has changed in ways that
make Reserve Bank services less essential
for dealing with the problems that have
beset it in times past, and what the future
role of the Federal Reserve Banks should
be as payment processing systems con-
tinue to evolve.
The following section examines the
operation of the payments system prior 
to the formation of the Federal Reserve,
focusing on aspects of the system that
were considered defects by advocates of a
central bank. Subsequent sections estab-
lish a conceptual framework for our anal-
ysis and describe the payment services
offered by the Reserve Banks and trends
in their share of the total volume and
value of U.S. dollar payments processed
each year. The article then discusses rea-
sons for the declining Reserve Bank share
of payment processing and the implica-
tions of these trends for the payments
system.
PROBLEMS WITH THE 
PAYMENTS SYSTEM PRIOR
TO THE FORMATION 
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
An analysis of the importance of
Reserve Bank payment services for the
banking industry in the United States
 
Bruce J. Summers is a senior vice president and chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. R. Alton Gilbert is a vice 
president and banking advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Mary C. Lohmann provided research assistance.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
4
2 The discussion of the check-
collection system prior to 1914
and changes made by the
Federal Reserve is based on
Spahr (1926), chapters IV, VI,
and VII; Watkins (1929), 
chapter VI; and White (1983),
chapter 2.
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requires a review of some banking history.
2
By the mid-1850s, the dollar value of U.S.
bank deposits exceeded that of banknotes,
and the value of transactions settled by
check exceeded the value of transactions
settled by banknote. This growth in 
check transactions required a system for
clearing a large number of checks among
banks. Before the introduction of Federal
Reserve services, commercial banks
cleared checks drawn upon other local
banks by channeling them through local
clearinghouses or delivering them directly
to the local banks for payment. Typically,
local checks could be collected quickly
and at par.
Collecting checks drawn on banks
outside a given community involved more
time and expense. When checks were pre-
sented directly to paying banks at their
place of business, the banks were required
by law to pay the face value of the checks.
Banking law did, however, permit banks to
pay less than the face amount of checks
submitted for collection by indirect means,
such as through the mail. The rationale 
for this deduction from the face amount,
called an exchange charge, was that remit-
ting payment could involve certain costs,
including the cost of transporting coin or
bank notes from the paying bank to the
collecting bank. Delays were another
expense to collecting banks, in addition 
to exchange charges. Under banking law, 
a bank that received checks through the
mail became the collecting agent for the
bank that had sent them and was therefore
responsible for obtaining payment from
itself. As a result, paying banks often
remitted funds to collecting banks several
days after receiving checks through the
mail.
Despite the rationale for exchange
charges, many bankers considered them 
a basic defect in the operation of the pay-
ments system. Prior to the formation of the
Federal Reserve System, there were several
major proposals and attempts by bankers
to eliminate exchange charges. Opposition
to exchange charges was most common
among bankers in the larger cities, where
banks generally paid for checks drawn 
on accounts of their depositors at par,
through local clearinghouses. The banks
that imposed exchange charges generally
were relatively small and located in more
isolated areas. 
Collecting banks attempted to avoid
these delays and exchange charges by
using the services of correspondent banks.
Often depository banks (the banks of 
ﬁrst deposit) sent checks drawn on banks
outside their communities to their cor-
respondent banks. The correspondents
would then send the checks to other banks
with ofﬁces near the paying banks, which,
in turn, would present the checks to the
paying banks over the counter. In this
system of collection through correspond-
ents, depository banks might receive less
than the face amount of the checks, but
more than if the checks were sent directly
to paying banks. The correspondents
would split the collection fee (the differ-
ence between the face value of the checks
and the amount credited to the demand
accounts of the depository banks) with the
other banks that had assisted them in get-
ting the checks to the paying banks. In
some arrangements, the correspondents
would credit the demand accounts of
depository banks for the full amount of the
checks being collected but would require
the depository banks to hold large demand
balances as a form of compensation for
this service. Under either arrangement, 
it was competition among correspondent
banks that tended to reduce the costs of
collecting interregional checks. 
The process of collecting checks
through correspondents as a means of
avoiding exchange charges led to some
notorious cases of checks passing through
the ofﬁces of many banks and traveling
over very long distances, relative to the
actual distance between the depository
bank and the paying bank. Many of the
resulting delays and operating expenses
could have been avoided through more
direct collection channels. Competition
among correspondent banks, however, 
led to substantially reduced levels of
exchange charges over time (Spahr, 1926,
pp. 102–3).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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3 Under the Federal Reserve’s
Regulation J, which governs the
collection of checks and other
items by Reserve Banks, an
“item” does not include a
check that cannot be collected
at par. Further, the Reserve
Banks are required to accept
cash and other items at par.
4 After passage of federal bank-
ing legislation in the 1860s,
the paper currency in circulation
comprised notes issued by
national banks and greenbacks
(ﬁat currency issued by the
United States Treasury).
Because national banks were
required to back their notes
with U.S. Treasury securities
deposited with the Treasury
Department, the public consid-
ered national bank notes as
safe as gold coins, even during
banking panics.
5 Some have criticized the
national banks in New York City
for suspending currency pay-
ments when they still had large
amounts of gold and currency
in their vaults. These critics
maintain that the banks were
too concerned about meeting
their legal reserve require-
ment—vault cash (gold and
currency) that equalled or
exceeded 25 percent of their
deposits—rather than using all
of the cash in their vaults to
meet demands of their deposi-
tors (Dewald, 1972).
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Although exchange charges declined
substantially over time, many bankers 
continued to view them as a fundamental
defect in the operation of the nation’s pay-
ments system. Congress responded to calls
for reform by giving the Federal Reserve a
mandate to improve the efﬁciency of the
payments system, and the Federal Reserve
responded by establishing a national net-
work of ofﬁces for collecting checks. Be-
cause the Federal Reserve Act forbids the
Reserve Banks from paying exchange
charges to banks, the Reserve Banks estab-
lished the practice of accepting for deposit
only those checks drawn upon banks that
had agreed to pay the Reserve Banks at
par.3 Although the Federal Reserve was not
granted legal authority over the exchange
charges set by individual banks, its domi-
nant operational role in check collection
eventually made collection at par (zero
exchange charges) a national standard for
the banking industry.
Another problem with the operation of
the payments system prior to the forma-
tion of the Federal Reserve in 1914 was
the occasional disruption of the payments
system caused by banking panics. When
events caused depositors to lose conﬁ-
dence in the safety of their deposits, they
demanded payment in gold coin, bank-
notes or greenbacks.4 Banks located out-
side the major ﬁnancial centers maintained
large shares of their cash assets in deposits
with major banks in the ﬁnancial centers,
particularly New York City, and they
tended to respond to depositors’ substan-
tial cash withdrawals by drawing down
deposits with these banks. Sprague (1910),
in his analysis of banking panics in the
national banking era, emphasized that the
concentration of bankers’ deposits in a
small number of banks in New York City
made the banking system vulnerable to
disruption.
Bankers attempted to cope with panics
through cooperative arrangements imple-
mented through their local clearinghouses.
During normal times, activities of the
clearinghouses were limited largely to
check clearing and settlement: Banks
deposited gold with the clearinghouses
and received certiﬁcates that served as
claims on the gold; they cleared checks
through the clearinghouses and settled
their net positions with clearinghouse 
certiﬁcates. At times of relatively high
depositor demand for gold and currency
(banknotes and greenbacks), the clearing-
houses created additional certiﬁcates for
interbank settlement, called loan certi-
ﬁcates. Banks that borrowed these addi-
tional certiﬁcates from their clearinghouse
pledged some of their commercial loans or
other securities to the clearinghouse as
collateral. This process of accepting bank
loans as collateral and issuing loan certiﬁ-
cates had the effect of increasing the
monetary base. Members of the clearing-
house could use the gold and currency in
their vaults to meet the demand of their
depositors without concern that they
would have insufﬁcient cash assets to
cover net debit positions at the clearing-
house. 
On several occasions after clearing-
houses had created loan certiﬁcates for
their members, clearinghouse members
also suspended currency payments to their
depositors. While creation of loan certi-
ﬁcates helped banks respond to unusually
large demands for currency, the loan
certiﬁcates were used primarily to settle
interbank positions with the clearing-
house. Banks were obligated to pay their
depositors gold or currency but did not
always do so when their inventories were
inadequate to meet the demand of their
depositors.
5 Instead, during some general
suspensions of currency payments to
depositors, banks paid their depositors
small-denomination loan certiﬁcates,
issued by their clearinghouses, which
served as substitutes for currency in emer-
gency situations (Andrew, 1908).
Before the creation of the Fed, when
banks in major ﬁnancial centers suspended
currency payments to depositors, major
disruptions in the payments system re-
sulted. There is evidence that these sus-
pensions, each of which lasted only one 
or two months during the period from 
the Civil War through 1914, seriously 
disrupted economic activity, includingFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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6 See Dwyer and Gilbert (1989)
and Roberds (1995). During
the 1930s, the Federal Reserve
was not effective in dealing
with banking panics. One view
is that banks relied on the
Federal Reserve to deal with
the panics, and the Fed did not
fulﬁll its role as the central
bank in the face of bank runs.
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interregional and foreign trade, partic-
ularly in 1873 (Sprague, 1910, pp. 71–82)
and in 1893 (pp. 119–210).
The Federal Reserve System, modeled
after the clearinghouses of the period, was
authorized to deal with panics by increas-
ing bank reserves through discount win-
dow loans.6 Its creators assumed that 
government sanction would lessen the
impact of banking panics, and an experi-
ence in 1914, just before the Fed was
created, may support this assumption. The
outbreak of war in Europe triggered runs
on U.S. banks. However, the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act of 1908 had authorized clear-
inghouses to put into circulation emergency
issues of national banknotes, which had
been printed and stored for such an event.
Roberds (1995), who ﬁnds that the real
economic impact of the panic of 1914 was
smaller than that of prior panics, argues
that the difference can be attributed to
government sanction for the emergency
issuance of national banknotes. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This section describes some concepts
that are fundamental to understanding the
operation of the payments system and the
role of the Reserve Banks. 
 
Clearing and Settlement
In describing Reserve Bank services, 
it is useful to distinguish between two
processes:  the clearing of payments and
interbank settlement of payment obliga-
tions. Most Reserve Bank services 
combine the clearing and settlement
functions, although the Reserve Banks
also offer interbank settlement services,
with the clearing of payments among the
banks performed through private chan-
nels. The implications for the payments
system of declining Reserve Bank opera-
tions depend on which function of the
Fed is affected more:  clearing or settle-
ment.
Clearing comprises three main steps:
processing payment instruments, deliver-
ing them to paying banks, and calculating
interbank payment obligations. Settlement
involves discharging the payment obliga-
tions. To illustrate the distinction between
these two functions, consider the clearing
and settlement of checks among banks
that are members of a clearinghouse.
Banks rely on the clearinghouse to perform
the clearing function when they exchange
checks drawn on each other. Then the
clearinghouse calculates the multilaterally
netted payment obligations due to and due
from each clearinghouse participant. Banks
participating in the clearinghouse have
various options for settling these obliga-
tions. Members of the clearinghouse can
agree to settle using cash or more likely the
deposit liabilities of a private bank, which
might also be a member of the clearing-
house, or through another institution.
Alternatively, settlement could be accom-
plished through the transfer of reserves
maintained at the Reserve Banks. Using
Federal Reserve Bank liabilities to achieve
interbank settlement is important from a
public policy perspective for at least two
reasons:  First, reliance on Reserve Bank
liabilities contributes to the robustness of
settlement arrangements and reduces the
moral hazard that might result if all pro-
viders of payment services relied upon a
small number of large commercial banks as
settlement intermediaries. Second, it is by
offering Fedwire and net settlement services
to clearinghouses that the Federal Reserve
is able to exert an indirect form of supervi-
sory inﬂuence on the safety and soundness
of private clearing arrangements, since the
Federal Reserve lacks statutory authority
over the operations of clearinghouses. (See
Juncker, Summers, and Young, 1991.)
Network Effects
According to the literature on indus-
trial organization, an industry has network
effects if the value of a service to a cus-
tomer depends on the number of other
customers using the service. These net-
work effects have important implications
for industry structure and competitive
behavior (see Economides and White,
1994; Katz and Shapiro, 1994).
Because the payments system has
some of the characteristics of a networkFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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industry, it is also important to consider
the role of network effects in its operation.
To illustrate, consider the value of mem-
bership in a check clearinghouse to banks
with ofﬁces in a community where several
banks conduct business. Initially, each
bank sends payment instruments to each
of the other banks demanding payment in
currency for checks that are presented.
Then, two of the banks in the community
decide that they can reduce their operating
costs—and the risk of having currency lost
or stolen—by arranging for their messen-
gers to meet at an intermediate point and
exchange checks. The two banks agree to
settle among themselves by debiting and
crediting balances they hold with each
other, rather than moving currency about
the community. 
This clearing and settlement arrange-
ment would be even more efﬁcient if these
two banks were to get a third bank to join
them, clearing checks among the three
banks under rules they agree to adopt as a
clearinghouse. In the same way, this clear-
inghouse would be even more valuable for
its members if additional banks joined. If
these network effects are strong enough,
there will be one check clearinghouse in
the community, and all banks with ofﬁces
there will be members.
In an industry with network effects,
the ﬁrst entity to develop a network has 
an advantage over later entrants. To be
successful in developing a rival network,
the new entity must convince many partic-
ipants to switch to its network simul-
taneously, since the value of a network to
each participant depends on the number 
of other participants using the network.
Many years ago, the Reserve Banks devel-
oped a dominant network for interregional
check clearing, which gave the Federal
Reserve leverage over the operation of 
the payments system. Even if some banks
did not like the rules under which the
Reserve Banks offered payment services 
or the process innovations favored by the
Fed, those with a lot of interregional
checks to clear found it advantageous to
use the Fed’s clearing and settlement
network. 
One alternative, of course, to using 
the Fed’s network is to develop a private
network for interregional check clearing.
Developing such an alternative would have
been especially difﬁcult prior to 1980,
however, when the Reserve Banks pro-
vided payment services to member banks
only, free of explicit charge. Prior to pas-
sage of the Monetary Control Act of 1980,
which required the Reserve Banks to
charge for their services, almost all of the
banks that cleared a high volume of inter-
regional checks were members of the
Federal Reserve System. A rival to the Fed
for interregional check clearing would
have had to convince banks to pay a posi-
tive charge per check (compared to a zero
charge per item in the Fed’s system) or
withdraw from Fed membership and 
rely on the new private system. Once the
Reserve Banks began assessing check-
clearing charges and requiring all banks 
to maintain reserves, the private systems
for check clearing became more viable
alternatives to the clearinghouse services
of the Reserve Banks.
Industries with strong network effects
also tend to be highly concentrated. If pri-
vate payments networks were to supplant
the role of the Reserve Banks, this develop-
ment would raise antitrust issues with
respect to access to the payments system.
Thus, the declining role of the Reserve
Banks in processing payments and the
development of private systems for check
clearing compel us to examine the issues




This section reviews the laws and 
Federal Reserve policies that govern the
activities of Reserve Banks as providers of
payment services. It also describes the
principal payment and payment-related
services provided by the Reserve Banks.
The appendix describes the payment
services of the Reserve Banks in more
detail and discusses major changes in the
services over the years.
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7 Operating circulars are detailed
instructions concerning particu-
lar banking services, including
account services, payment ser-
vices, and the discount window.
Some apply uniformly to all 12
Reserve Banks, while others
apply to the services of individ-
ual Reserve Banks.
8 For an analysis of the value of
“free” Reserve Bank payment
services to member banks rela-
tive to the opportunity cost of




The Reserve Banks function as bank-
ers’ banks:  Banks that use the Fed’s pay-
ment services maintain reserve balances 
at the Reserve Banks and have access to
credit from the Fed. All transactions cleared
through the Reserve Banks are settled on a
gross basis; that is, the value of each trans-
action is settled through a debit or credit
to a bank’s reserve account. Occasionally,
debits and credits resulting from use of the
Fed’s payment services can cause a bank 
to miss its target for reserves, or they can
cause a negative reserve balance. Reserve
Banks lend reserves to banks that are tem-
porarily short of funds, including both
intraday credit (daylight overdrafts) and
overnight credit (discount window loans
or overnight overdrafts). The Reserve
Banks also serve as ﬁscal agents to the fed-
eral government by providing payment
services to the United States Treasury and
to various other government agencies.
Reserve Banks have special privileges
and powers as suppliers of payment services.
For example, they have legal authority to
present checks for same-day settlement
later in the day than do private banks. 
Further, Reserve Banks have access to priv-
ileged supervisory information concerning
the condition of banks, which they may
use to protect themselves from losses in
providing payment services and related
credit. In addition, they can create reserves
to meet the liquidity needs of banks. 
Law and Policy Governing Reserve
Bank Services
The Reserve Banks provide payment
services under the authority of the Federal
Reserve Act, as amended over the years.
The terms and conditions under which
they provide services are governed by 
regulations of the Board of Governors 
and implemented through Reserve Bank
operating circulars.
7
The Monetary Control Act of 1980
(MCA) was a watershed for the Reserve
Banks as providers of payment services.
Prior to passage of the MCA, the member
banks in the Federal Reserve shouldered a
required reserve burden which they could
satisfy through only two forms of non-
earning assets:  deposits held in accounts
with the Reserve Banks and vault cash.
Banks that were not members of the Fed
system were not burdened by this require-
ment. Provision of “free” payment services
by the Reserve Banks was viewed as an
offset to the reserve requirement burden.
8
But the MCA changed all that:
1. It extended the reserve require-
ments of the Federal Reserve to all
depository institutions.
2. It granted all depository institu-
tions access to the discount window
and to Reserve Bank services.
3. It required the Reserve Banks to
charge explicit fees for their services. 
Under the MCA, the Reserve Banks’
revenue from fees on their payment
services must, over the long run, equal or
exceed the cost of providing the services
plus a markup to reﬂect the tax rates and
proﬁt rates of private-sector ﬁrms (see
shaded box on MCA guidelines). Thus, 
the MCA subjects the Reserve Banks to
MCA GUIDELINES FOR PRICING
BANK SERVICES
The following section of the Monetary Control Act
(MCA) speciﬁed guidelines for the pricing of Reserve
Bank services:
“Over the long run, fees shall be established on the
basis of all direct and indirect costs actually incurred in
providing the Federal Reserve services priced, includ-
ing interest on items credited prior to actual collection,
overhead, and an allocation of imputed costs which
takes into account the taxes that would have been paid
and the return on capital that would have been provid-
ed had the services been furnished by a private busi-
ness ﬁrm, except that the pricing principles shall give
due regard to competitive factors and the provision of
an adequate level of such services nationwide.”
Thus, the basis for the Federal Reserve’s setting the
prices of its payment services below levels as speciﬁed
in this section of the MCA is inadequate competition in
markets for payment services or an inadequate level of
services in at least some regions of the nation.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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market discipline similar to that faced by
commercial ﬁrms:  Reserve Banks must
provide services efﬁciently, price them
competitively, and meet the market’s stan-
dards for quality services. Further, they
must be careful to gauge the proﬁtability 
of new service offerings. 
Since passage of the MCA, the Federal
Reserve Board has also issued guidelines
that specify in more detail the conditions
under which Reserve Banks may provide
payment services. The guidelines issued in
June 1981, state that “the System should
be prepared to remove itself from the pro-
vision of those services that can be sup-
plied more efﬁciently by the private sector,
unless there are overriding public interest
considerations for maintenance of an 
operational presence by the System” (Fed-
eral Reserve Regulatory Service 7–191).
Further, the Board of Governors’ May 1990
policy statement on the role of the Federal
Reserve in the payments system sets ad-
ditional conditions to be met before the
Reserve Banks may offer new payment ser-
vices:  “the service should be one that
other providers alone cannot be expected
to provide with reasonable effectiveness,
scope, and equity” (Federal Reserve Regu-
latory Service 7–145.1). Thus, the MCA,
together with Federal Reserve Board poli-
cies, establishes market-oriented criteria
for determining whether and how the
Reserve Banks are to provide services.
While these formal and explicit condi-
tions under which Reserve Banks may
continue to offer existing services or enter
new payment markets were developed after
passage of the MCA, earlier decisions by the
Board of Governors suggest something
about the Federal Reserve’s philosophy in
providing services. In particular, there is evi-
dence that, well before the MCA, the Board
wished to proscribe Reserve Bank involve-
ment in the processing of new types of
payment instruments. In the second half of
the 1960s, for example, the Federal Reserve
came under some pressure from bankers to
adapt its check-clearing services to handle
the processing of credit card sales slips. For
a variety of reasons, including concern over
the public sector’s shouldering signiﬁcant
new costs for handling a quasi-payment
instrument, the Board decided to deny the
credit card industry access to the check
clearing infrastructure of the Reserve Banks
(Brimmer, 1967). Accordingly, the Reserve
Banks play no role in processing credit card
transactions. Instead, a private-sector infra-
structure has grown up to support this
important component of the payments
system.
In contrast to this decision on pro-
cessing credit card slips, the Board agreed,
at approximately the same time, to requests
from bankers that the Reserve Banks pro-
vide operational support for the nascent
automated clearinghouse (ACH) as a
method of processing payments. The ACH
represented a desirable alternative to checks
that would require new automation sys-
tems and signiﬁcant start-up costs. Be-
cause these start-up costs would have been
difﬁcult for the private sector to absorb,
the Board permitted the Reserve Banks to
take on this new operational responsibility.
Payment Services of the 
Reserve Banks
 
Cash Services. The Reserve Banks provide
coin and currency to banks on demand
and receive excess coin and currency from
banks; the banks’ reserve accounts are 
debited and credited for the value of these
transactions. However, Reserve Banks do
not charge banks for cash services, since
the Board has determined that cash
services are a central bank function.
Check Clearing. The ofﬁces of Reserve Banks
throughout the nation receive checks from
banks for collection, and the proceeds from
the collection of these checks are credited to
the reserve accounts of the depositing banks.
The timing of credits reﬂects the length of
time required for the Reserve Banks to present
the checks to the banks on which they are
drawn (paying banks) and to receive pay-
ment, which is made by debiting the reserve
accounts of the paying banks. To facilitate this
process, the Reserve Banks operate a national
system for transporting checks to the paying
banks. Reserve Bank check-collection services
include both the clearing function (receivingFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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CALCULATING THE FED’S SHARE
The calculations in Tables 1–3 are based on three categories of checks processed
by Federal Reserve Banks: those issued by the federal government, U.S. postal money
orders, and all other checks (referred to as “commercial checks”). Commercial checks
processed in the United States include “on-us” checks—checks drawn on the banks
where they were ﬁrst deposited. Since “on-us” checks do not have to be cleared
between banks, in all three tables we have subtracted them from the totals for inter-
bank checks processed in the United States.
For example, the ﬁgures for 1980 in Table 1 were calculated in this manner:
Annual Reports of the Board of Governors include the numbers of checks processed
by the Reserve Banks each year. The Annual Report for 1980 indicates that the
Reserve Banks processed 15,721 million commercial checks, 705 million government
checks, and 117 million postal money orders. The number for commercial checks,
however, reﬂects double counting:  Checks received by one Reserve Bank that were
sent to another Reserve Bank for collection were counted as checks processed by each
bank. Beginning in 1982, the Annual Reports eliminated this double counting of com-
mercial checks. The numbers for 1982 are available with and without the double
counting:  The number of commercial checks processed without double counting is
94 percent of the number with double counting. Applying this 94 percent adjustment
to the data for 1980 yields an estimate of 14,777.7 million commercial checks, and
15,599.7 million for total checks, including government checks and postal money
orders.
The total number of commercial checks in the nation in 1980 is estimated as 42
percent of the number of commercial checks processed by the Reserve Banks. We
divided the 
 
number of checks the Fed processed by the percentage of checks that it
processed to arrive at the total number of commercial checks issued in the United
States in 1980:
14,777.7m/.42 = 35,185 million.
Of these 35,185 million checks, approximately 29.6 percent, or 10,414.8 million,
were “on-us” checks. We subtracted the “on-us” checks from the commercial checks,
then added the federal government checks and the U.S. Postal orders to arrive at the
total number of interbank payment items processed in 1980:
35,185m – 10,414.8m + 705m + 117m = 25,592.2 million.
In Table 2, the average estimated value of a check in 1980 was $792, and the aver-
age estimated value of an “on-us” check was $867. Average check values in these
tables are based on the values in the 1979 Atlanta Fed Check Study, adjusted for inﬂa-
tion and other factors. The values for checks processed by the Federal Reserve are
actual, except that 1980 data have been adjusted for the double counting that was
used in Federal Reserve reporting systems at that time. We multiplied the number of
commercial checks by the average value per check (35,185 million 
 
3 $792) to arrive
at a total value of $27.9 trillion for checks processed in the United States in 1980. We
then subtracted the estimated value of “on-us” checks (10,414 million 3 $867 = $9.0
trillion) and added the value of federal government checks ($599 billion) and postal
money orders ($6 billion) to arrive at a total value of $19.4 trillion.
In Table 3, we divided the number of payment items that the Federal Reserve
Banks processed by the total number of interbank payment items processed in the
United States (as calculated in paragraph 3, above) to arrive at the Federal Reserve’s
share of payment-items processing for 1980:
15,599.7 million / 25,592.2 million = .61, or 61 percent.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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checks and presenting them to paying banks)
and the settlement function (debiting and
crediting reserve accounts).
Automated Clearinghouse. Banks that use
the Federal Reserve’s ACH service instruct
Reserve Banks to pay other banks (ACH
credit entries) or to receive payment from
other banks (ACH debit entries). These
entries are processed through the computer
facilities of the Reserve Banks (clearing func-
tion), and entries are posted to the reserve
accounts on the settlement dates designated
by the banks (settlement function).
Safekeeping of Deﬁnitive Securities and
Noncash Collection. Reserve Banks accept
deﬁnitive securities (securities in paper
form) for safekeeping. This service, how-
ever, is now largely limited to securities
used to collateralize government deposits
and discount window loans. The Reserve
Banks collect interest coupons and
matured securities and credit the proceeds
to the reserve accounts of banks that own
the securities.
Wire Transfer of Funds. Banks with re-
serve accounts at Reserve Banks may initiate
transfers of their reserves to other banks
through the Fedwire funds transfer service.
Fedwire is a real-time gross settlement
system. Fedwire funds transfers are pro-
cessed electronically and are ﬁnal when
accepted for processing by the Reserve
Banks. A ﬁnal payment is one which is
unconditional and irrevocable. Clearing 
and settlement is virtually simultaneous.
Fedwire is described as a large-value funds
transfer service because it is designed to
facilitate interbank funds transfers (Horii
and Summers, 1994).
Wire Transfers of Securities. Ownership
of United States government securities and
some agency securities is recorded in the
securities accounts held by the Reserve Banks.
Banks can transfer ownership of these se-
curities via the Fedwire securities transfer
service, and each transfer is ﬁnal when ac-
cepted by the Reserve Banks for processing.
Fiscal Agency. The Reserve Banks provide
account, custodial, and payment services to
the U.S. Treasury and to a variety of other
government agencies. These services in-
clude issuing and redeeming U.S. Treasury
securities as well as securities of other U.S.
agencies.
Net Settlement. Banks that are members
of private clearing organizations may
decide to settle their mutual obligations
through multilateral netting. If a private
clearing service uses the net settlement
services of the Reserve Banks, the net debit
and credit positions of the private banks
are settled through entries to their reserve
accounts at the Reserve Banks.
TRENDS IN CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT
The Reserve Banks’ share of total inter-
bank payments has declined since 1980 for
at least three of the four principal types of
payment instruments:  checks, large-value
funds transfers, and large-value securities
transfers. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the de-
clining Reserve Bank components for both
the volume and the value of interbank pay-
ment transactions. We have not been able
to develop a time series on the share of the
volume and value of ACH payments
processed by the Reserve Banks. 
Check Clearing 
Table 3 indicates a signiﬁcant decline in
the Reserve Banks’ share of interbank check
clearing, in terms of both volume and
value.9 Between 1980 and 1994, the Reserve
Bank’s component of interbank check-
clearing volume declined by about one-
third, from an estimated 61.0 percent to
39.3 percent, while its check-value compo-
nent declined from an estimated 48.5 per-
cent to 24.9 percent. These declines are
consistent with a conventional interpreta-
tion of major changes in the interbank check
clearing market, including (1) the introduc-
tion of Reserve Bank pricing for services,
mandated by the MCA, (2) a fairly rapid
development of alternative private-sector
channels for check clearing, and (3) adop-
tion by the Board of Governors of same-day
settlement amendments to Regulation CC. 
These amendments to Regulation CC,
effective January 1, 1994, changed the
9 Interbank check clearings are
so-called “transit items,” for
which the payor (check writer)
and payee have accounts at dif-
ferent banks. These are in con-
trast to “on-us” checks, for
which the payor and payee
have accounts at the same
bank.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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rules under which banks pay each other
for checks. Before implementation of the
same-day settlement provisions, a bank
presented with checks directly by another
private bank could either pay the collect-
ing bank the following business day or
charge the bank a fee for payment the
same day. Reserve Banks, in contrast, deb-
ited the reserve accounts of paying banks
the same day they delivered the checks to
the banks, and the Reserve Banks did not
pay fees for this privilege. When private
correspondents complained that these
rules gave the Reserve Banks an unfair
advantage, the Fed adopted the same-day
settlement regulation, which says that if a
collecting bank presents checks to the
place of business of a paying bank before 
8 a.m. local time, the paying bank must
return the checks or pay the collecting
bank through a Fedwire funds transfer by
the close of business the same day. The
paying bank is not allowed to charge the
collecting bank a fee for same-day settle-
ment. Banks may waive these rules for the
timing of check presentment and means 
of payment if they wish (Fitzgerald and
Macoy, 1993; Crockett, 1994b). Reserve
Bank check collection volume through
September 1994 was 12 percent below the
volume for the same period in 1993. This
decline is attributed largely to same-day
settlement (Marjanovic, 1994b).
Automated Clearing House (ACH) 
The Reserve Banks are the dominant
processors of ACH payments. They handle
all government-related transactions and a
Volume of Interbank Non-Cash Transactions
(in millions of transactions)
 
1980 1985 1990 1994
Type of Payment FR Total FR Total FR Total FR Total
Check1 15,599.7 25,592.2 16,687.0 33,489.8 19,304.0 39,670.0 17,149.0 43,637.4
ACH2 227.0 –– 585.0 –– 1,435.0 –– 2,379.0 2,521.8
Large-Value 25.8 39.0 45.0 69.9 62.6 99.9 72.0 117.5
Funds Transfer3
Securities Transfer4 –– –– 7.7 7.7 10.9 12.9 12.6 19.1
Card N/A –– N/A –– N/A 10,478.1 N/A 13,681.0
Sources:  Annual Reports of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Bank for International
Settlements.
1 See Shaded Box, page 10.
2 Total ACH volume represents Federal Reserve commercial and government items plus items processed exclusively by private-sector
arrangements. The ﬁgures for Federal Reserve volumes are taken from actual, recorded data. The source of the estimate for the pri-
vate-sector volume is the National Automated Clearing House Association. The private ACH processors active in 1994 included the
Arizona ACH, Hawaii ACH, New York ACH, and Visa ACH. Data for private ACH processors for periods before 1994 are either not avail-
able or incomplete. Note that the majority of items handled by private ACH processors are also delivered to the Federal Reserve for 
processing, to gain access to endpoints serviced only by the Federal Reserve. In 1994, for example, the total number of items actually
originated and received by private ACH operators was estimated to be 521 million; of these, only 143 million were also delivered 
exclusively within the private arrangements.
3 The total volume of large-value funds transfers is the sum of Fedwire funds transfers and Clearing House Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS) transfers.
4 Total number of Fedwire securities transfers plus adjusted gross volume estimates for the securities transfers of the Government
Securities Clearing Corporation (GSCC) and the Participants Trust Company (PTC). The GSCC estimates were adjusted downward by sub-
tracting the number of end-of-cycle transfers made through Fedwire, to avoid double counting. All securities transfers of the
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) were processed through PTC; they could, however, have been processed by Fedwire,
had the Federal Reserve chosen to provide such services to GNMA.
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large share of commercial transactions.
However, their present share of the volume
and value of interbank ACH transactions,
which exceeds 90 percent, does not appear
to be sustainable. In addition to the Re-
serve Banks, three private organizations
process ACH payments:  the Arizona
Clearing House Exchange, the New York
Clearing House, and Visa USA. The ﬁnan-
cial press cites the share of ACH payments
processed by the Reserve Banks at about
80 percent, with these three organizations
processing the remaining 20 percent (Mar-
janovic, 1995a,b). This statistic is based on
the fact that these private organizations
receive 20 percent of total ACH entries.
However, some of the ACH entries these pri-
vate organizations receive are routed through
the Reserve Banks for processing. 
In this paper, the volume of ACH pay-
ments attributed to the Reserve Banks is
that actually processed by the Reserve
Banks, whether the originating institutions
delivered the information on ACH entries
to the Reserve Banks or to private proces-
sors. This method of calculating the com-
ponent of ACH payments processed by 
the Reserve Banks is consistent with the
Value of Interbank Non-Cash Transactions 
(in trillions of dollars)
1980 1985 1990 1994
Type of Payment FR Total FR Total FR Total FR Total
Check1 9.4 19.4 10.1 31.9 13.2 43.5 12.6 50.6
ACH2 0.3 –– 2.1 –– 4.7 –– 8.4 9.1
Large-Value 47.9 85.0 109.1 187.5 199.1 421.1 211.2 506.6
Funds Transfer3
Securities Transfer4 –– –– 74.2 74.5 99.9 108.1 144.7 170.0
Card N/A 0.1 N/A 0.2 N/A 0.5 N/A 0.7
Sources:  Annual Reports of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Bank for International
Settlements.
1 See Shaded Box, p. 10. 
2 The value of transactions handled by the Federal Reserve plus the value of transactions handled solely by private ACH processors (see
Table 1, footnote 2). For 1994, the estimated value of ACH transactions processed solely by the private sector was about $700 billion.
3 The sum of the value of Fedwire funds transfers and Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) transfers.
4 The sum of the value of Fedwire securities transfers, plus the value of the adjusted gross volume for the Government Securities Clearing
Corporation (GSCC) plus the value of Participants Trust Company (PTC) adjusted gross volume. See Table 1, footnote 4, for more details.
Table 2
Federal Reserve Share of Interbank Non-Cash Transactions
Check ACH Large-Value Funds Transfers Securities Transfers
Year Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
1980 61.0 48.5 –– –– 66.2 56.4 –– ––
1985 49.8 31.7 –– –– 64.4 58.2 100 100
1990 48.7 30.3 –– –– 62.7 47.3 84.5 92.4
1994 39.3 24.9 94.3 92.3 61.3 41.7 66.0 85.1
Table 3method of calculating the component of
checks processed by the Reserve Banks. For
instance, checks counted as processed by
the Reserve Banks include those deposited
by the banks of ﬁrst deposit, and by banks
that serve as intermediary correspondents
for the banks of ﬁrst deposit. 
The high Reserve Bank share can be
attributed to the unique circumstances
surrounding the development of the ACH
payment mechanism, which was initially
subsidized by the Reserve Banks. Signiﬁ-
cant developments in the market for ACH
services in the last ﬁve years, relating to
changes in technology, banking structure
and the entry of private providers, will
almost surely combine to reduce the pro-
portion of ACH payments processed by 
the Reserve Banks.
Large-Value Funds Transfer
The Reserve Banks guarantee ﬁnality
of funds transfers among banks over Fed-
wire; private banks that receive funds
transfers over Fedwire do not have to be
concerned that the transfers will be re-
versed by the Reserve Banks because of the
failure of the sending banks to fund their
payments through the Reserve Banks.
Casual observers of the market for large-
value funds transfer might conclude that
the Federal Reserve would have a virtual
monopoly on this service. The information
in Tables 1, 2, and 3, however, indicates
that this conclusion would be incorrect.
Large banks that are members of the Clear-
ing House Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS)—a wholesale wire-transfer net-
work owned and operated by the New
York Clearing House—use that system as
an alternative to transfers over Fedwire for
large-value funds transfers. Members of
CHIPS net their interbank obligations
multilaterally and settle these obligations
as a group at the end of the day using Fed-
wire funds transfers. They use CHIPS
largely for settling the dollar side of for-
eign exchange and for other international
transactions.
The component of total large-value
funds transfers (over Fedwire and CHIPS)
handled by Fedwire declined from 1980 to
1994. The volume component fell from
66.2 percent to 61.3 percent, and the value
component fell from 56.4 percent to 41.7
percent. While the reasons for the rise in
the CHIPS component of large-value funds
transfers are complex, they are related in
part to the rapid growth of international
payments. The Reserve Banks have not
considered the settlement of foreign
exchange and other international transac-
tions to be part of the mission of Fedwire,
and, therefore, they have not attempted to
design the Fedwire service to meet the 
speciﬁc funds-transfer needs of that 
part of the market. They have, however,
responded to the market for funds-
transfer services, and to new record-
keeping requirements resulting from
anti-money-laundering legislation, by
adopting a new format for funds transfers
over Fedwire that is based on the stand-
ards of the Society of Worldwide Inter-
bank Finance Telecommunications (SWIFT).
Conversion to the new format will be 
completed by the end of 1997.
Another factor that may have reduced
the Reserve Banks’ share of large-value
funds transfers is the Federal Reserve’s pay-
ments system risk-reduction program,
which in recent years has increased the
appeal of multilateral netting for banks. The
risk-reduction program, which has placed
signiﬁcant emphasis on containing the
amount of intraday credit provided by the
Reserve Banks, has probably stimulated use
of alternatives to Fedwire for clearing large-
value transactions.
10 On the other hand, the
risk controls adopted by CHIPS, which have
increased the cost of funds transfers over
that system, have tended to offset the effects
of the Reserve Bank’s risk-reduction
measures.
Securities Transfer
As with funds transfer, the casual
observer might conclude that the Federal
Reserve has a virtual lock on the market
for securities transfers. In fact, however,
the Federal Reserve has restricted the
range of U.S. Treasury securities and
agency securities for which the Reserve
Banks serve as depositories and provide
10For a description of the policy
of the Federal Reserve on day-
light overdrafts and payments
system risk, see Richards
(1995).
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14transfer services. As a result, private sys-
tems for clearing and settling transactions
involving these securities have developed.
For example, the Participants Trust Com-
pany (PTC) now serves the entire market
for clearing and settlement of Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA)
securities. 
Private-sector arrangements for net-
ting securities transactions are also becom-
ing more attractive to banks. The Govern-
ment Securities Clearing Corporation
(GSCC) has developed a multilateral net-
ting service for future-dated U.S. govern-
ment securities transactions, and it is in
the process of testing an enhanced service
that will support netting for same-day
transactions. Introduction of this service
by GSCC will likely trigger a signiﬁcant
further decline in the Reserve Banks’ share
of government and agency securities trans-
fers. Table 3 indicates that Fedwire’s share
of the volume of securities transfers de-
clined from 100 percent to 66.0 percent
between 1985 and 1994. The Reserve Bank
share of the value of securities transfers fell
from 100 percent to 85.1 percent over the
same period.
Card Transactions
As we noted earlier, the Reserve Banks
do not clear payments made by cards.
Table 1 shows that credit-card transactions
have grown rapidly in recent years and by
1994 accounted for about 18 percent of
the number of payments made by credit
card, check and ACH. If payments based
on other types of cards, such as debit 
cards and stored-value cards, grow rapid-
ly relative to older types of payments
instruments, the percentage of all retail
payments processed by the Reserve 
Banks can be expected to continue 
declining.
In summary, the Reserve Banks’
components of both the volume and the
value of interbank payments have declined
for small-value retail and large-value
wholesale funds and securities transactions
since about 1980. Prospective develop-
ments, including introduction by GSCC 
of multilateral netting for same-day gov-
ernment securities transfers, can be
expected to cause signiﬁcant further
reductions in the Reserve Bank component
of large-value securities transfers. In addi-
tion, continued increases in the use of new
types of retail (small-value) payments
instruments, in which the Reserve Banks
are not active, could erode further their






Tables 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the
Reserve Banks’ historically important role
in providing clearing services has been
declining, although it is still signiﬁcant.
Changes in technology and in banking
structure have reduced the Reserve Banks’
advantages in providing the dominant net-
work for clearing and settlement of pay-
ments. In addition, the policies of the
Board of Governors have stimulated a
greater role for the private sector in
clearing interbank payments.
Technology
New technology is perhaps the single
most important force leading to new ini-
tiatives for processing payments in the 
private sector. Within the last decade or
so, the costs of both computer processing
and data communications have fallen 
dramatically. As a result, automated pro-
cessing systems are now within the ﬁnan-
cial reach of individual institutions as well
as private clearinghouses. At one time,
ACH processing required large mainframe
computer systems. Now, very powerful,
small, and relatively inexpensive micro-
processors are able to handle large
volumes of transactions. Moreover, value-
added networks offer a wealth of national
and even international data communica-
tions pathways, including networks with
sufﬁcient control and security features to
handle electronic payment transactions.
Thus, dramatic reductions in costs have
facilitated the development of alternative
networks for payment processing func-
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conclude that nationwide inter-
state banking would reduce the
resources used in check collec-
tion. In addition, they estimate
that it would reduce the share
of total checks processed by
Reserve Banks by between 43
and 60 percent over a 10-year
period.
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tions that were once the primary domain
of the Reserve Banks.
Banking Structure
Regional interstate banking has also
reduced the advantages of the Federal
Reserve in interregional check clearing.
Banking concentration resulting from the
rise in interstate banking has increased the
proportion of transactions handled by
banks as “on-us” transactions, which by-
pass interbank clearing and settlement
channels. Further, bank holding companies 
have been able to organize payments clear-
ing among their afﬁliated banks on a re-
gional basis, often by establishing regional
processing centers. Today, the country is
experiencing a major new interstate bank-
ing movement as a result of the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency
Act of 1994. More and more, interstate
banking extends network efﬁciencies to pri-
vate institutions throughout the country,
thus eroding the Fed’s interregional check-
clearing advantage.11
The last 10 or 15 years have seen the
formation of national clearinghouses for
both paper and electronic transactions. For
example, in 1991, Visa USA began offering a
national ACH processing service. Further,
the New York Clearing House has expressed
interest in expanding the geographic scope
of its ACH service and connecting its pro-
cessing network to other private sector
providers, such as Visa (Marjanovic,
1995a,b). With respect to check clearing,
the National Clearing House Association,
formed in 1992, arranged the clearing of an
estimated 2 million checks per day in 1994
(Marjanovic, 1994a). Similarly, the Elec-
tronic Check Clearing House Organization
(ECCHO) which was introduced in 1990,
was clearing an estimated 1 million checks
per day by 1994, on the basis of electronic
cash letters (Crockett, 1994a). Banks are
also active in establishing consortia to
exchange retail transactions in ATM and
point-of-sale networks. Formation of these
private networks for clearing payments
reﬂects, to some extent, the increased con-
centration of banking in recent years. A few
large banking organizations now can ex-
change large volumes of checks and other
payment instruments directly, without
relying on a processing intermediary. 
Federal Reserve Policy
The Federal Reserve has strongly
embraced market techniques that promote
more efﬁcient payment operations. Expli-
cit pricing of Federal Reserve payment
services, introduced by the MCA, has elim-
inated subsidies to banks that use Reserve
Bank services. In addition, explicit pricing
of intraday, reserve-account overdrafts has
increased the costs of using Reserve Bank
services for banks with relatively large
intra-day overdrafts (Richards, 1995).
Finally, the Federal Reserve Board’s action
in January 1994 requiring same-day check
settlement helped to reduce the barriers to
check clearing between private parties.
Accordingly, within the last 15 years, the
explicit cost of using Federal Reserve pay-
ment-processing services has been put on
more comparable terms with private-sector
alternatives, and artiﬁcial legal barriers to
private clearing have been removed. 
Federal Reserve Board policy has also
limited the involvement of the Reserve
Banks in the payments system by restrict-
ing the scope of their services. For in-
stance, the Federal Reserve declined to pro-
vide services for clearing and settling credit
card sales slips and book-entry transfers of
GNMA securities. The limitations on the
scope of Reserve Bank payment services
have facilitated the development of private
systems for clearing and settling payments. 
Outlook for Fed Payment Services
Technology, banking structure, and
Federal Reserve policy will likely continue
to inﬂuence payments processing, certain-
ly for the foreseeable future. The outcome
is likely to be a continuation of the trends
shown in Table 3—declines in the com-
ponents of various types of interbank
payments processed by the Reserve Banks.
Indeed, because virtually all the factors
discussed in this paper have emerged rela-
tively recently, the trends in Table 3 could
accelerate, at least for small-value pay-
ments such as checks and ACH.SOME IMPLICATIONS OF
REDUCTIONS IN RESERVE
BANK SERVICES
Trends in the processing of payments
by Reserve Banks have implications for the
efﬁciency of the payments system and for
the risk of disruptions in the operation of
the payments system.
Implications for Efﬁciency
Subsidy for use of Reserve Bank Services.
Prior to 1980, the Reserve Banks did not
charge member banks explicit fees for use
of their payment services. In the 1970s, 
the Reserve Banks may have compounded
the inefﬁcient use of resources in the pay-
ments system by subsidizing the collection
of local checks through the establishment
of Regional Check Processing Centers
(RCPCs). Because RCPCs provided same-
day check crediting to the reserve accounts
of collecting banks for checks drawn upon
banks located in the same area, many local
check clearinghouses could not compete
and closed down (Frodin, 1984). While 
the establishment of RCPCs may have accel-
erated the speed of collection, it created
additional incentives for banks to use the
Fed for check clearing rather than con-
tinuing direct exchanges of checks among
nearby banks.
12 Recent declines in the use of
Fed payment services reﬂect more efﬁcient
use of resources resulting from the elimina-
tion of the subsidy provided by “free”
Reserve Bank services.
Implications of Interstate Banking. Inefﬁ-
ciency in the check-collection system prior
to 1914 reﬂected, to a large extent, the lack
of nationwide banking organizations. High
exchange charges and lengthy delays in
check collection that resulted from arrange-
ments to avoid exchange charges would
have been reduced or eliminated by nation-
wide banking.
13 The spread of nationwide
interstate banking reduces the chances that
the declining role of the Reserve Banks in
payment processing will produce a return
to the kind of payments system inefﬁ-
ciency that existed prior to the formation
of the Federal Reserve. Interstate banking,
however, might also lead to distortions in
the pricing of payment services that 
would result from collusive behavior by 
a few large, nationwide branching organi-
zations.
Federal Reserve as Payments System Rule
Maker. The success of innovations in
improving the efﬁciency of the payments
system requires cooperation among
providers of payment services. For in-
stance, the Fed and the banking industry
agreed many years ago to encode checks
with magnetic characters (the MICR line)
that make it possible for banks to sort
checks by machine. This innovation would
have been of little value if it had been
adopted by only a few banks. Another ex-
ample involves the truncation of checks in
the collection process:  To maximize the
beneﬁts of truncation (in which the actual
paper check is taken out of circulation),
the ﬁrst bank that handles a check would
convert the paper instrument into an elec-
tronic instrument and send the payment
information on the check through the col-
lection system electronically. Such an in-
novation would require the cooperation of
virtually all banks.
Prior to 1914, the payments system of
the United States functioned without a
mechanism by which banks could co-
operate in adopting innovations to make
interregional check collection more efﬁ-
cient. Clearinghouses played such a role in
their local communities. There was, how-
ever, no national clearinghouse to coor-
dinate change for the national payments
system. Banks collected checks drawn on
banks located in distant cities through a
correspondent banking system that often
routed checks to paying banks indirectly,
to avoid the exchange charges of paying
banks. Indirect routing of checks increased
the expense and length of time in check
collection. Since its formation, the 
Federal Reserve has functioned as the 
de facto national coordinator of the
payments system. The role of Reserve
Banks as major providers of payment ser-
vices has been important in facilitating a
number of improvements in the efﬁciency
12For a description of RCPCs and
analysis of their implications for
the efﬁciency of the payments





13Jessup (1967) reports that
nonpar banks (those imposing
exchange charges) tended to
be located in unit banking
states. This observation sup-
ports the claim that nationwide
branch banking would have
reduced or eliminated exchange
charges.
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lowing:
1. Elimination of nonpar banking.
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2. Addition of the MICR line to
checks, making them readable by
check-sorting machines.
3. Creation of the automated clearing-
house.
4. Expedited processing of return
items after passage of the Expedited
Funds Availability Act.
5. General promotion of check imag-
ing and electronic presentment
(Marjanovic, 1996).
Will the beneﬁts of this leadership and
innovation be lost if the Reserve Banks
have a substantially smaller role in the
processing of payments in the future? 
Not necessarily. Even with a smaller opera-
tional role for the Reserve Banks, the 
Federal Reserve Board, with its broad regu-
latory power, can continue to promote
payments system efﬁciency. An important
example of the Board’s use of this regula-
tory authority to promote efﬁciency in 
the check-collection system is its recent
introduction of same-day settlement for
checks, which took effect in January 1994.
The Fed’s same-day settlement regulation
sets the rules under which collecting
banks present checks and receive payment
the same day without paying fees to paying
banks. The authority for this action of the
Board is derived from the Expedited Funds
Availability Act of 1987, which granted the
Board regulatory authority over interbank
payment relationships for purposes of pro-
moting efﬁciency of the payments system.
Implementation of the change did not re-
quire a large operational role for the Re-
serve Banks; in fact, it has caused a decline
in the check collection volumes of the
Reserve Banks (Marjanovic, 1994b).
Increased concentration of the bank-
ing industry through interstate banking
can facilitate innovation through coopera-
tion among the banks themselves, inde-
pendent of the Fed’s efforts. The evidence
suggests that, in the past, there were too
many banks for effective cooperation.
Associations of relatively small numbers of
large banks, however, can work out agree-
ments on innovations that beneﬁt a major-
ity of their members. For instance, the
banks that formed ECCHO agreed to ac-
cept electronic transmission of information
about checks as legal presentment. In
March 1995, the New York Clearing House
announced that its members had reached
similar agreement (Marjanovic, 1995c).
These examples illustrate innovation in
the payments system through voluntary
association. 
Large numbers of banks are able to
coordinate the clearing and settlement of
payment instruments other than checks,
and to adopt innovations. For example,
Visa and Mastercard coordinate their pay-
ment operations for thousands of their
member banks. The growth of regional
ATM networks indicates that many
14Some authors challenge the
idea that actions of the Reserve
Banks to eliminate nonpar
banking improved the operation
of the payments system. See
Baxter (1983). The literature
on exhange charges provides
conﬂicting views of this subject.
See Frankel (1995); Gilbert
(1991); and Salop (1990).
For purposes of this section, it
is sufﬁcient to argue that, given
the limited power Congress
granted to the Reserve Banks
over the operation of the pay-
ments system, the Federal
Reserve was effective in estab-
lishing clearance of checks at
par as the standard for the
banking industry only because
of the major role of the Reserve
Banks in check clearing and
settlement.
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SAME-DAY SETTLEMENT:  RISK
REDUCTION FOR COLLECTING
BANKS
Prior to the implementation of the Federal
Reserve’s same-day settlement regulation, banks that
collected checks through correspondents generally
received payment in the form of credits to their bal-
ances at correspondent banks. Under the new regula-
tion respondent banks can send checks directly to
paying banks and receive payment the same day via
wire transfers of funds to their reserve accounts at
Reserve Banks. Adoption of same-day settlement, there-
fore, gives respondent banks more options for limiting
their exposure during periods of ﬁnancial distress. For
relatively small banks, however, the cost of collecting
checks through direct presentment may exceed the risk
of collecting through correspondents. The operating
costs of collecting checks through direct presentment
include the costs of sorting checks and arranging for
couriers to present them directly to the paying banks.
Even in times of ﬁnancial stress in the banking indus-
try, relatively small banks that rely on correspondents
for check collection are more likely to continue using
correspondent bank services than to switch their check-
collection operations to direct presentment.bankers can work together to provide ATM
services for their customers. The National
Automated Clearinghouse Association
(NACHA) sets rules and standards for
ACH, even though it does not itself pro-
cess ACH payment items. Finally, there are
well established institutional arrangements
for setting standards for various aspects of
the payments system. Thus, past expe-
rience with check collection in the United
States may exaggerate somewhat the
importance of the Reserve Banks as pro-
viders of payment services in facilitating
innovation in the payments system. 
Access to Payments Systems. When the
Reserve Banks provided the dominant
nationwide system for banks to clear and
settle payments, access to the payments
system was determined by legislation and
the operating rules of the Reserve Banks.
As private organizations emerge to rival
the Reserve Bank’s nationwide clearing and
settlement arrangement, access will be
determined at least in part by these private
organizations. Various agencies of the gov-
ernment and the courts might become
involved in settling disputes on the condi-
tions under which private arrangements
for clearing and settling payments may
exclude some providers of payment
services.15
Check Clearer of Last Resort. Issues
raised by the role of the Reserve Banks as
check clearer of last resort have implica-
tions for both efﬁciency and risk. The rise
in Reserve Bank check clearing during the
Texas banking crisis during the second
half of the 1980s and early 1990s illus-
trates the role of Reserve Banks as check
clearer of last resort (Clair, Kolson and
Robinson, 1995). When major banks head-
quartered in the Southwest were in serious
ﬁnancial trouble, respondents turned to
the Fed for check collection because they
did not want to suffer disruptions and pos-
sible losses resulting from the failure of
their correspondents (see shaded box,
page 18). Given their major role in check
processing, the Reserve Banks can absorb
additional check volume when circum-
stances disrupt other check-collection channels. 
If the Reserve Banks’ check collection
volumes fall substantially in the future,
and their capacity to clear checks is re-
duced accordingly, they may no longer be
able to fulﬁll the role of check clearer of
last resort. In periods of ﬁnancial stress,
this situation could put an extra burden of
responsibility on the banking industry for
ensuring the safe operation of the payments
system. Banks collecting checks would
need to be vigilant in managing their risk
when choosing correspondents and in
agreeing to forms of settlement for checks
presented directly to paying institutions.
In this context, the Federal Reserve’s 
Regulation F , “Limitations on Interbank
Liabilities,” mandates careful management
of such interbank relationships.
Implications for Risk
Does the declining role of the Reserve
Banks in processing payments increase the
risk of payments system disruption? The
answer depends on the nature of the
shocks to the payments system. 
Bank Runs. Prior to the formation of the
Federal Reserve System, depositor runs
were the most important source of risk to
banks. The Fed can deal with threats origi-
nating from depositor runs by injecting
reserves into the banking system through
open-market operations and discount
window loans. In addition, federal deposit
insurance limits the vulnerability of banks
to depositor runs.
Securities Transfers. Another possible
shock to the payments system would be
the disruption of arrangements for trans-
ferring ownership of securities. Is it
important that the Reserve Banks retain 
a major role in processing securities 
transfers in order to minimize the effects
of such shocks on the payments system?
Alternatively, are private arrangements 
for securities transfers sufﬁciently 
sound to minimize the chances of such
shocks?
Parties to securities transactions must
be able to trust their agents to perform 
as contracted. For instance, individual
investors in corporate stock must trust
15See Carlton and Frankel
(1995) for analysis of a court
case involving a dispute over
access of a bank to Visa for
issuing credit cards. Carlton and
Salop (1996) discuss the issue
of access by ﬁrms to joint ven-
tures in a variety of cases.
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to their orders. They must also trust that
the organizations established to clear
trades and settle obligations among bro-
kers will be effective in settling trades. 
For investors in U.S. Treasury and agency
securities, banks function as their agents
by holding securities with the Reserve
Banks and with private depositories. When
the investors decide to sell, the banks use
Fedwire or a private system to transfer
ownership of the securities and settle the
trades. For investors in securities trans-
ferred through privately operated systems,
the risk of not receiving the securities 
they have paid for, and the risk of not
receiving cash for securities they have
sold, depends on the reliability of netting
arrangements among members of the 
systems.
Securities transfers through private
systems have not created problems for the
operation of ﬁnancial markets, because
these systems are well designed. In ad-
dition, active oversight by authorities such
as the Federal Reserve has ensured that
such private arrangements have the con-
trols and guarantees needed to make them
reliable. In particular, the guidelines for
operation of delivery vs. payment systems
that were released by the Federal Reserve
Board on June 15, 1989, refer to various
controls, including liquidity safeguards,
credit safeguards, and open-settlement
accounting.
As long as the private systems for
securities transfers are appropriately super-
vised and maintain adequate risk controls,
the migration of securities transfers from
the Reserve Banks to private systems
would not appear to create problems for
the operation of ﬁnancial markets. The fol-
lowing sections indicate, however, why the
Fedwire service for transferring funds and
securities remains essential for the settle-
ment of obligations among members of
these private systems. These sections also
discuss the limited authority of the Federal
Reserve over the operations of private
clearing organizations which is derived
from the role of the Reserve Banks in pro-
viding settlement services.
Settlement Using Liabilities of Private
Banks: Moral Hazard and Systemic Risk.
Another source of shock to the U.S. pay-
ments system could result from the failure
of a major bank used for settlement by a
signiﬁcant number of other banks. Prior
to 1914, banks settled payment obliga-
tions among themselves by transferring
ownership of deposit liabilities at private
banks, and major disruptions occurred
when customers lost conﬁdence in the
nation’s money center banks. Given the
declining role of the Reserve Banks in pro-
cessing payments, the future might bring
increased public reliance on a few large
banks for settling payment obligations. If
it does, the government might need to
ensure the survival of those banks, to pre-
vent disruption of the payments system.
This reliance on a few large banks at the
heart of the payments system could
amplify any moral hazard in bank supervi-
sion and regulation. Since the failure of
the bank would be too disruptive to the
payments system, participants in the
ﬁnancial system could assume that there
would be little risk in transactions with
those banks, including the purchase of
their short-term liabilities.
Multilateral Clearing Arrangements and
Systemic Risk. Systems for clearing pay-
ments among banks can be designed to
avoid the moral hazard outlined above.
Consider, for instance, the design of
CHIPS. Federal Reserve policies that apply
to the operation of private large-dollar
funds-transfer systems such as CHIPS
include the requirement that such systems
have means to ensure settlement in the
event of a default by a major participant.
Since these arrangements would prevent
major disruptions in the payments system
in the event of the failure of a particular
bank, investors in bank equities and liabil-
ities cannot assume that any one bank is
essential to the operation of the payments
system.
We argue that the Reserve Banks must
continue to offer Fedwire services to facili-
tate access to reserve accounts and espe-
cially, to ensure the integrity of net settle-
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settlement services of Reserve Banks in
their transactions with private payments-
clearing systems must have a mechanism
like Fedwire for transferring reserves, to
cover their net debit positions. At times,
these banks must borrow reserves from
each other to cover their net debits. Fed-
wire enables them to transfer securities
electronically, both to provide collateral to
lenders, and to post collateral with Reserve
Banks for discount window borrowing.
Authority of the Federal Reserve over
the operations of private clearing organiza-
tions rests principally on the role of the
Reserve Banks as providers of settlement
services, since the Fed has no statutory
authority for central bank oversight of pri-
vate clearing organizations. As a service
provider, the Federal Reserve can make
safe-and-sound operation of clearing orga-
nizations a condition to their using its
interbank settlement services. The Board
stated its standards for the operation of
private clearing organizations in Decem-
ber 1994, in a policy statement titled
“Privately-Operated Large-Dollar Multilat-
eral Netting Systems.” The threat of
discontinuing its settlement support for
such clearing organizations, however, is a
very blunt supervisory instrument. For
example, the Fed could disrupt clearing-
house operations, and therefore the 
payments system, by withdrawing its
settlement services. The simple fact that
the Fed could itself trigger an immediate
operational crisis by withdrawing support
for settlement calls into question the 
Federal Reserve’s willingness ever to
invoke such a harsh action.
The trends in the U.S. dollar payments
system described in this paper indicate a
major shift toward greater reliance on pri-
vate arrangements for clearing both small-
dollar and large-dollar payments. Increased
privatization of the U.S. dollar payments
system and a concomitant decline in the
operational role of the Federal Reserve
Banks raise questions about the adequacy
of the Federal Reserve’s supervisory
authority to fulﬁll the original Congres-
sional mandate for ensuring the stability of
the nation’s payments system. In fact, the
Federal Reserve appears to be somewhat
unusual among central banks in that it
does not have explicit statutory powers
related to the supervision of clearing orga-
nizations. Some of the private clearing
organizations have implemented new risk
controls to ensure settlement in the event
of default by any of their members. These
actions indicate some of the Fed’s regula-
tory clout under current limitations on its
statutory authority. It is unclear, however,
whether the Fed’s indirect inﬂuence on
private clearing organizations through its
role as provider of settlement services will
be sufﬁcient to ensure the safety and sound-
ness of the payments system in the future.
CONCLUSIONS
The Federal Reserve Banks’ role in
processing payments—in terms of both
volume and value—has declined since
1980, when Congress enacted legislation
requiring the Reserve Banks to charge for
their payment services. This decline can be
expected to continue or even accelerate in
the future. While the declines in the shares
of payments processed by the Reserve Banks
following pricing of the services represent a
more efﬁcient use of payments system re-
sources, the declining role of the Federal
Reserve Banks in payments processing has
other important implications for the efﬁ-
ciency and stability of the payments system.
One of these implications relates to
innovation. In the past, the actions of the
Reserve Banks to foster innovation in the
payments system relied on the status of the
Reserve Banks as major providers of pay-
ment services. Will the Reserve Banks’
declining role in payments processing
eliminate the Fed’s leadership in innova-
tion? Not necessarily. The Federal Reserve
Board has broad authority to promote safe
and efﬁcient payment methods undertaken
bilaterally between depository institutions,
especially in the check-collection system.
This authority is independent of the Re-
serve Banks’ operating role in the pay-
ments system. In addition, the growing
concentration of the banking industry
through interstate banking is facilitating
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that would have been more difﬁcult when
there were many more separate banking
organizations.
At the same time, the growth of pri-
vate payment networks raises some impor-
tant new issues with respect to competi-
tion. In the past, access to the payments
system was determined largely by law and
by Federal Reserve policies; now some of
the issues involving access to the new pri-
vate payments arrangements will be settled
in the courts.
Does the declining role of Reserve
Banks in processing payments increase the
risk of disruption in the operation of the
payments system? The answer depends on
how banks in bilateral and multilateral 
private clearing arrangements settle their
obligations. Settlement through debits and
credits to accounts at private banks would
make the system vulnerable to disruption
in the event of sudden failure by banks
that provide settlement services. Fortunately,
the settlement services of the Reserve Banks
can limit this risk—to banks, and to the
Federal Reserve in its role as lender of last
resort. To facilitate the use of reserves for
interbank settlement, whether net or gross,
Reserve Banks should continue offering
Fedwire funds and securities transfer ser-
vices and net settlement services. The
Federal Reserve System is able to inﬂuence
the practices of clearinghouses primarily
by setting conditions for their use of the
settlement services of the Reserve Banks.
The Fed does not have statutory authority
to act as the supervisor of clearing organi-
zations. It is not clear at this time whether
the Fed’s limited inﬂuence over clearing
organizations will be adequate to maintain
the safety and soundness of the payments
system as the share of payments cleared
through private channels continues to rise.
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23PAYMENT SERVICES OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS
Cash Services
The Reserve Banks have a government
monopoly on issuing currency, which they
process for banks. They also process coin
issued by the United States Mint. Reserve
Banks process cash deposits and shipments
without charge to banks, at least for a 
certain basic level of service, since this 
is considered a government function. 
In accepting deposits of currency and 
meeting orders for currency, the Reserve
Banks maintain the quality and the
integrity of the currency stock. They
employ sophisticated processing equip-
ment that separates currency ﬁt for cir-
culation from unﬁt currency, which is
destroyed. Reserve Banks also identify
counterfeit notes, relying on the anti-coun-
terfeiting features built into the design of
the ofﬁcial currency. 
Check Clearing
Since their formation, the Reserve
Banks have provided a nationwide check
clearing service. Check processing now
takes place at 11 of the 12 Reserve Bank
head ofﬁces, 24 of the 25 branches, 11
regional check-processing centers
(RCPCs), and one additional facility. The
Reserve Banks cooperate in managing this
system in a highly-integrated manner and
share some facilities and mechanisms,
including a national transportation system
for transporting checks.
Each Federal Reserve check-processing
ofﬁce serves an ofﬁcial territory, which is
designated by routing numbers encoded at
the bottom of checks. A territory may
include a small but highly concentrated
area, such as a city, or a larger area with
banks dispersed across a large region.
Routing numbers are the de facto national
standard for check-clearing territories
throughout the United States.
The Reserve Banks accept for
collection checks (cash letters) drawn on
banks located within the same territory, as
well as checks drawn on banks located in
other Federal Reserve territories.16 The
high degree of cooperation among the
Reserve Banks in processing interterritory
checks, and especially in debiting and
crediting reserve accounts of banks located
throughout the nation, facilitates an
efﬁcient nationwide check-clearing and
settlement system.
The Reserve Banks accept shipments
of checks in various degrees of sorting,
including unsorted, sorted by Federal
Reserve territory, or sorted by the banks on
which the checks are drawn. Since sorting
checks by territories or by the banks on
which they are drawn is costly, the banks
that send checks to the Reserve Banks
already sorted are charged less than the
banks that send checks unsorted and rely
on the Federal Reserve Banks to sort them. 
Like correspondent banks, Reserve
Banks credit the accounts of the depositors
of checks according to published avail-
ability schedules. That is, the depositors
are able to count on receiving credit for
checks drawn on banks located in different
Federal Reserve territories according to a
published time schedule, regardless of the
Federal Reserve’s ability to present the
items within that schedule. Any ﬂoat that
results from mismatching the time of cred-
iting the accounts of the depositing banks
and the time of presentment to and debit-
ing the accounts of paying banks is a cost
of doing business for the Federal Reserve.
Float is factored into the base costs recov-
ered through explicit fees.17
In recent years, the Reserve Banks
have provided a variety of value-added
check-clearing services, particularly
electronic information services demanded
by check-clearing customers. Banks that
receive cash letters (bundles of checks
written by depositors) from the Reserve
16Cash letters are bundles of
checks accompanied by regis-
ters that list the contents of the
bundles and the total value of
the items they contain. These
bundles are called “cash let-
ters” because settlement for
the checks is in cash-equivalent
funds, subject to the rules gov-
erning the return of checks.
17For a discussion of how ﬂoat
arises, is controlled, and what it
costs, see Veale and Price
(1994).
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AppendixBanks can receive electronic transmissions
that show the account numbers and dollar
values of individual checks, information
that normally would be physically pre-
sented later in the day. Timely availability
of this information greatly aids banks in
offering cash-management services to their
large corporate customers. 
In addition, the Reserve Banks are
beginning to offer electronic check-deposit
and presentment services, as well as trun-
cation services, for banks that elect to
settle checks in this manner. Reserve
Banks recently have begun to offer image-
processing services both to commercial
banks and to the U.S. government. For
example, images of government checks are
captured and stored in archives, facilitating
federal government investigations and
claims settlements that involve payment by
check. In addition, commercial image ser-
vices are now being provided to banks,
especially services designed to expedite
check adjustments and returns.
Automated Clearinghouse
The automated clearinghouse (ACH)
is an electronic alternative to check
processing. In fact, the ACH was originally
most attractive as a means of converting
payroll disbursement and other recurring
money transfers from check-based transac-
tions to electronic transactions. The ACH
is both a credit and a debit payment mech-
anism; that is, customer banks can make
payments and withdrawals from accounts
within the system. Use of ACH debit
entries increases the efﬁciency and speed
of transactions such as insurance
premiums and mortgage payments, and
they facilitate the concentration of cash by
treasurers of businesses that maintain
demand deposit accounts at large numbers
of banks.
The Reserve Banks began providing
ACH services to the United States Treasury
and commercial banks in 1972. The
federal government was a pioneer in con-
verting its own paper-based check
payments to ACH. At its inception, ACH
processing required a very signiﬁcant
investment in computer technology. Only
a large organization like the Federal
Reserve System, with its established tech-
nical infrastructure and its extensive
access to capital, was in a position to
invest in a venture of this magnitude, for
which the return was still uncertain. More-
over, the volume of payments at ACH’s
inception was not sufﬁcient to justify the
costs of the large initial investment for
most companies. An exception was the
New York Clearing House, which chose 
to handle the processing for ACH transac-
tions in the Second Federal Reserve
District. Over the years, the Arizona
Clearing House and Visa USA, Inc. have
also established successful ACH processing
operations. The Chicago Clearing House
also attempted to offer an ACH processing
service but discontinued its service after a
few years.
Safekeeping of Deﬁnitive Securities
and Non-cash Collection
The Reserve Banks continue to
provide deﬁnitive safekeeping and non-
cash collection services to depository
institutions, but on a signiﬁcantly reduced
scale in comparison to earlier years.18
Deﬁnitive securities are paper instruments,
such as bonds issued by state and local
governments. Safekeeping for such securi-
ties includes accepting them under a trust
agreement, collecting interest coupons,
and redeeming matured securities. Today,
only three Federal Reserve ofﬁces provide
these services as priced services, although
they do so for depository institutions
located throughout the United States. 
Each Federal Reserve Bank does safe-
keep securities it accepts as collateral for
discount window loans and/or in its role
as fiscal agent. The demand for such ser-
vices eventually will disappear completely
as all securities are converted from paper
to book-entry form, with ownership
recorded and transferred electronically in
the records of depositories.
Wire Transfer of Funds and Securities
Banks can transfer reserves among
themselves electronically through the 
Fedwire funds transfer service. This is a
18Non-cash items are handled on
a collection basis, meaning that
principle and interest are credit-
ed to the accounts of banks
with securities in safekeeping
when collected, not on the
basis of a published availability
schedule.
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vides ﬁnal payment. Each transfer is
processed separately without a netting of
payment messages among banks (gross
settlement), and the transfer of funds is
ﬁnal, which means that it cannot be
reversed. If a bank sends a payment
message over Fedwire and later fails while
its reserve account is overdrawn, the
Reserve Bank holding the overdrawn
reserve account cannot recover funds from
the receiver of the payment message. The
ﬁnality of Fedwire funds transfers make
them a unique type of payment, quite dis-
tinct from other payment services pro-
vided by the Reserve Banks. For instance,
the Reserve Banks do not guarantee that
credits to reserve accounts resulting from
check collection are “good funds.” If a
Reserve Bank cannot collect from a bank
on which the checks have been drawn, it
has the right to reverse the credits to the
reserve account of the depositing bank.
Fedwire funds transfer is a natural
monopoly, in that only the Federal Reserve
can provide ﬁnal settlement of reserves
transfers.
Reserve Banks began providing the
Fedwire funds transfer service in 1918 via
telegraph. Today the Reserve Banks
operate a highly-sophisticated computer
network with more than 8,000 on-line
connections to the Fedwire funds transfer
system. The Fedwire securities transfer
service dates to 1967, when the Reserve
Banks agreed with the United States Trea-
sury to begin converting U.S. Government
securities to book-entry form. The
computer system of the Reserve Banks
became the depository for ownership of
the government securities. The Fedwire
securities transfer service is also a real-
time gross settlement service, providing
for the simultaneous delivery of securities
and payment in ﬁnal funds on the books of
the Reserve Banks.
19 This delivery-versus-
payment feature of securities transfers over
Fedwire limits the risk to participants in
the market for government securities,
because a seller of securities can transfer
ownership to a counterparty in a transac-
tion without concern about whether the
counterparty will pay for the securities.
Since the Reserve Banks assume any
risk from the transfer of reserves over Fed-
wire, the Fedwire funds transfer service is,
together with federal deposit insurance
and the discount window, part of the fed-
eral safety net for the banking system. It’s
important to note that, given the high
volume, value, and velocity of wire trans-
fers, the Fedwire service is able to operate
efﬁciently as a real-time gross settlement
system only because the banks that use
Fedwire have access to signiﬁcant amounts
of intraday credit from the Reserve Banks.
When the Reserve Banks agree to process
Fedwire funds transfers on behalf of ﬁnan-
cially troubled institutions, they essentially
guarantee payments by these institutions,
thereby providing conﬁdence to counter-
parties receiving the payments and con-
tributing to the stability of the payments
system. The Reserve Banks manage the
risk in providing this guarantee through a
combination of operational and ﬁnancial
controls.
An important milestone in the Fedwire
funds and securities transfer services was
the introduction of explicit pricing of Fed-
eral Reserve intraday overdrafts on April
14, 1993, to provide banks an incentive to
limit their use of intraday credit (Richards,
1995; Summers, 1995). 
Fiscal Agency
One of the roles of the Federal Reserve
Banks is to serve as a ﬁscal agent for the
U.S. government. The Reserve Banks pro-
vide services to the United States Treasury
and to a variety of other government agen-
cies, as requested by the Treasury
Department. For example, they collect
checks, process ACH transactions, and
make wire transfers on behalf of the ﬁscal
principals. They provide a variety of cash
management services for government
agencies, including collection, cash
concentration, and letters of credit. In
addition, they service the public debt and,
through the Fedwire securities transfer
service, provide operational support for
the secondary market in U.S. government
and agency securities. Approximately 12
19The Reserve Banks maintain
book-entry securities accounts
for banks just as they maintain
funds accounts in which banks
hold reserves.
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the twelve Reserve Banks is attributable
directly to their role as ﬁscal agents (Fed-
eral Reserve Planning and Control System).
Net Settlement
Net settlement is a service provided by
the Federal Reserve Banks to a group of
banks that clear payments among
themselves, net their interbank positions,
and settle their net debit and credit
positions through entries to their reserve
accounts. These arrangements can be clas-
siﬁed as “ﬁnal” or “provisional.” Net
settlement entries classiﬁed as ﬁnal are not
reversible by the Reserve Banks, whereas
provisional entries are reversible.
In December of 1994, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System
issued a policy statement governing large-
value arrangements, which establishes the
conditions that such arrangements must
meet to operate and to gain access to Fed-
eral Reserve net settlement services.20
Large-value settlement arrangements
include electronic funds transfers (for
example, the Clearing House Interbank
Payments System or CHIPS) and electronic
securities clearing and settlement (for
example, the Government Securities
Clearing Corporation or GSCC). To mini-
mize the systemic risk associated with
large-value netting arrangements, the new
policy statement requires that these
arrangements be designed to achieve ﬁnal
settlement. Members use Fedwire to settle
their net debit obligations resulting from
net settlement. Also, one private ACH ser-
vice and one check-clearing arrangement
use Fedwire for net settlement.
The Reserve Banks also provide settle-
ment services for small-value payments to
approximately 160 local and regional
clearinghouses throughout the country.
The small-dollar settlements are for a
variety of netting arrangements, predomi-
nantly check clearinghouses, but also for
credit card systems and ATM and POS net-
works. Settlements for these netting
arrangements are provisional. The Federal
Reserve does not guarantee that credits to
reserve accounts resulting from use of its
provisional net settlement service rep-
resent “good funds.” If a Reserve Bank is
not able to collect the net debits from
members of a group, it may reverse the
entries made to the reserve accounts for
the net settlement.
One reason depository institutions
have a strong interest in using the Federal
Reserve for interbank settlement is that
virtually all depository institutions in the
United States hold reserve accounts at 
the Reserve Banks (Blommestein and Sum-
mers, 1994). They are uniquely positioned
to meet the needs of clearinghouses with a
diverse membership, since virtually all the
clearinghouse members would hold
accounts with the Reserve Banks. In addi-
tion, the Reserve Banks are able to offer
their natural monopoly advantage of pro-
viding ﬁnal settlement in central bank
money, rather than in terms of the
liabilities of another private bank.
20Federal Reserve Press Release,
December 21, 1994, Docket
No. R-0842.
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